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NOTES AND COMMENTS
scope, and extensive use of the available discovery procedures." In
view of the fact that in some instances even the combination of exten-
sive investigation and artfully drawn pleadings and discovery pro-
cedures may not supply the ultimately effective proof of these
elements, a statute expressly shifting the burden of proof to defendant
may be required.
MACK B. PEARSALL
Federal Income Taxation-Alimony and Support Payments-Effect
of Contingent Reduction Provisions in Property Settlements
The 1961 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Com-
missioner v. Lester' provides for simplicity of interpretation and
certainty of tax consequences where property settlement agreements
incident to divorce or separation are subject to contingent alteration.
Prior to 1942, a taxpayer who was divorced or legally separated
from his wife was generally not entitled to deduct alimony from
gross income.' The Revenue Act of 1942' changed this by requiring
a wife4 to include in gross income "periodic" payments received from
her husband made in discharge of a marital duty.5 A complimentary
or falsity of the same, and the same are therefore denied." Record, p. 4,
Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255 N.C. 462, 122 S.E.2d 64 (1961).
Conceivably, if the plaintiff had alleged ownership, agency, and scope in
separate paragraphs an admission of one or more then might have been
forced.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-568.1-.27 (1953).
1366 U.S. 299 (1961), affirming 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960), reversing
32 T.C. 1156 (1959).
1 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 8 (1935); Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S.
151, 153 (1917). Alimony was deductible from gross income when the
divorce decree, settlement agreement, and state law operated as a complete
discharge of liability for support. Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149, 156
(1940); Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1939).
S56 Stat. 798 (1942).
'For purposes of simplicity it is assumed the husband is paying alimony
or support; however, the statute covers a situation in which a wife is re-
quired to pay alimony to the husband. Elinor Stewart Sokol, 7 T.C. 567
(1946); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §3797(a)(17) (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 7701 (a) (17)).
5Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(k), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942)
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71), provided "periodic payments .. . re-
ceived . . . in discharge of . . . a legal obligation which, because of the
marital or family relationship, is imposed upon or incurred by such husband
under ... a written instrument ... shall be includible in the gross income
of such wife .... This subsection shall not apply to that part of any such
periodic payment which the terms of the... written instrument fix, in terms
of... a portion of the payment, as a sum which is payable for the support
of minor children of such husband."
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provision allowed a husband to deduct from gross income payments
his wife was required to include.6
If the decree or agreement provides for a single sum payable to
the wife for the support of herself and minor children of the marriage,
with no allocation of the payment between the parties, no difficulty
is experienced. The wife is clearly taxable on the entire sum.1
Where the agreement or decree makes a provision for the minor
children in a definite sum or proportion, it is just as clear that the
wife is not taxable on this amount.' However, in agreements where
the husband attempts to make flexible provision for both a wife and
minor children, subject to reduction as the wife's household becomes
smaller, the payments have not-always .been clearly allocable between
alimony and child support. The Lester decision settled this problem
by holding that before any of the payment is excluded from the wife's
income the agreement must specify a sum certain or a percentage of
the payment which is fixed for child support.
.- The -Tax. Court -with supporting decisions in the First,"
Seventh,' .2 and Ninth" Circuits, held that if there were a reasonable
indication or -inference that any portion of a payment was intended
to be payable for child support then such portion was not includible
in the gross income of the wife. In Eisinger v. Commissioner,14 a
decision exemplary of the Tax Court approach, the agreement pro-
, ' Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(u), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942)
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 215). The statute was enacted to relieve the
husband from the burden of paying alimony plus the higher taxes which were
anticipated during the war. It was envisioned that in many instances the
husband would not'have'enough money to make both payments. H.R. REi.
No. 2333,-77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942).
7 Joslyn v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1956); see Richard P.
Prickett, 18 T.C. 872 (1952). The same result follows regardless of the
amount actually expended on the minor children by the wife. Constance B.
Kirby, 35 T.C. 306 (1960); Frances Hummel, 28 T.C. 1131 (1957); Hen-
rietta S. Seltzer, 22 T.C. 203 (1954); Dora H. Moitoret, 7 T.C. 640 (1946).
8 J.ohn W. Harris, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1167 (1961); Earl S. Douglass,
30 P-H Tax Ct 1 Mem. 245 (1961); Martha J. Blyth, 21 T.C. 275 (1953),
aeq., 1954-1 CuM. BuL. 3.
0 Lester v. Commissioner, 366 U.S. 299, 303.
10 Russell W. Boettiger, 31 T.C. 477 (1958), acq., 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 3;
Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C. 1308 (1950); Warren Leslie, Jr., 10 T.C. 807
(1948). But see Elsa B. Chapin, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 782 (1947) (con-
tingent reduction only if'wife'remarriied).
" Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1959).
1 Mandel v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1950).
1 Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,





vided for specified reductions in weekly payments when a child
reached his majority or died. The agreement also provided that all
payments should cease upon the wife's remarriage and, in lieu thereof,
the husband was to pay the wife a certain amount for the support of
each child until he attained his majority or died. The court held that
the agreement "earmarked" with sufficient clarity the portions in-
tended for the support of minor children and alimony, and that when
such amounts could be readily determined without reference to con-
tingencies which might never occur, then such part of the periodic
payment was sufficiently "fixed" within the meaning of section 22 (k)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.'
The Second Circuit adopted a stricter view in Weil v. Commis-
sioner.'8 The only reduction there was contingent upon the wife's
remarriage. The court held that such a contingency did not suffi-
ciently allocate an amount payable for the support of minor children,
and that "sums are 'payable for the support of minor children when
they are to be used for that purpose only'-. ... [T] he wife must have
no independent beneficial interest therein."' 7
Baker v. Commissioner" was a forecast of how the Second Cir-
cuit would rule when a computation based on contingencies was in-
volved. In that case the taxpayer was obligated to pay his wife a
stipulated monthly sum, with no principal sum named in the agree-
ment. The payments were to cease in six years or if the wife should
remarry or die before the end of that period. The Commissioner and
the Tax Court disallowed a deduction for periodic alimony payments
on the theory that they could calculate the principal sum. 9 .The
Second Circuit reversed, and held that arriving at a principal sum
by calculation might be a sound principal if there were no contin-
15 See note 5 supra.
18240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 958 (1957). -
17Id. at 588; accord, Hirshon's Estate v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 497 (2d
Cir. 1957) (per curiam). As a result of Weil and Eisinger, Rev. Rul. 59-
93, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 22, was issued, stating that the Internal Revenue
Service would follow the Weil decision only in situations factually similar
(reductions contingent only upon wife's remarriage). To determine if a
portion of the payments made in accordance with a divorce decree or separa-
tion agreement is alimony or payable for child.support, the rationale of
Eisinger would be followed.
8 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953); accord, Burton v. United States, 139
F.Supp. 121 (D. Utah 1956). 1
" Only "periodic" payments are considered alimony under 'the statute.
Payments which are considered "installments" on a principal sum, discharge-
able in 10 years or less, are not considered alimony. See Barrett v. United
States, 296 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1961); Int. Rev. Code of 1939,§22(k)
(now INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 71 (c)).
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gencies involved; however, there was present a stipulated cessation
of the payments if the wife remarried or died. The possibility that
either of these contingencies might occur before termination was
sufficient reason to doubt the validity of the calculation.20
In accord with the Second Circuit is the Sixth Circuit decision of
Deitsch v. Commissioner,21 in which the court held that the term
"fix" as used in section 22 (k) was not ambiguous and that "It there-
fore must be construed in its usual sense of 'to assign precisely...
to make definite and settled.' ",22 Thus the decisions in the Second
and Sixth Circuits clearly departed from the view of the Tax Court
and the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
In order to resolve this conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Commissioner v. Lester.23  The agreeement
there provided for a monthly sum payable to the wife for both ali-
mony and child support, subject to reduction on occurrence of speci-
fied contingencies. All payments were to cease on the death of either
husband or wife, or upon her remarriage. Should either of the chil-
dren die, become emancipated, or marry, the payments were to be
reduced by one-sixth. The husband had deducted the entire payment
as alimony.
The Commissioner disallowed a portion of that deduction on the
grounds that a reasonable inference could be drawn that one-sixth
of each payment was intended to be "payable for" support of a minor
child. The Tax Court24 agreed with the Commissioner and held that
if it is clear from the terms of the agreement that a portion of the
payment is to be applied for the support and maintenance of minor
children, then such amount should be considered as a sum "fixed"
as payable for child support.
On appeal, the Second Circuit 25 looked to the complete discretion
" Compare Davidson v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1955) With
Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957). In Davidson the
Ninth Circuit cited Baker and arrived at the conclusion that since no princi-
pal sum was stated the payments were periodic and includible in the wife's
gross income.
21249 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957). The agreement here provided for reduc-
tions in monthly payments as each child reached the age of 18. Payments
were to cease altogether if both children should die or become emancipated.
Accord, Ashe v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1961) (vife had
discretion in use of entire payment) (decided under both the 1939 and 1954
Codes). But see Budd v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1947) (percuriam).rDeitsch v. Commissioner, supra note 21, at 536.
23366 U.S. 299 (1961).
J'erry Lester, 32 T.C. 1156 (1959).2 Lester v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
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the wife retained in the use of the money and held the entire payment
to be alimony.2" The fact that, as the size of the family diminished,
the periodic payments were reduced in a fixed amount did not neces-
sarily mean that the wife's discretionary power had been diminished.
In reversing, the court held that if the agreement itself did not de-
clare a portion of the payment to be for the support of minor children,
then Congress intended to tax the wife on the entire payment.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Commissioner and the Tax
Court that the contingent reductions relating to the death, emanci-
pation, or marriage of the children might be a reasonable indication
of an intention by the parties to provide for the minor children, but
found that such a view is inconsistent with the further provision for
a complete cessation of the payments should the wife remarry. The
Court felt that this provision raised an equally sufficient indication
that the parties intended the entire payment to be alimony. To re-
solve this inconsistency, the Court resorted to the Committee Reports
of the House and Senate on the Revenue Act of 1942.27 As. origi-
nally proposed, section 22(k) provided that for the husband to be
taxable on any part of the payment, such part must be "specifically
designated" as payable for child support. This was changed to
"fixed" in the final draft of the statute in order to obtain more
"streamlined language."2 The Court held that it was the intention
of Congress that "the agreement must expressly specify or 'fix' a
sum certain or percentage of the payment for child support before any
of the payment is excluded from the wife's income."29
The Court has devised two tests to determine if any or all of a
periodic payment is "payable for" child support. The agreement
2 She retained control over the disposition of the payments, and could
allocate the money between herself and the minor children as she thought
best. "Indeed such a construction [the Tax Court's] would defeat what is
the basic meaning of such an agreement, for the mother is to be free to use
her judgment in allocating the collective unit among her children and her-
self." Id. at 357.
"7 H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71, 73 (1942) ; S. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, 86 (1942). The Court found that the statute
was enacted to resolve inconsistencies and uncertainties in the application of
the federal revenue laws because of varying restrictions on the use of un-
specified child support money among the several states, and to relieve the
husband of the burden of paying both alimony and the tax thereon.
2 Hearings Before Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 7378, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1942).
26 Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 303. The resort to legislative
history seems justified in the light of the ambiguity of the statute when ap-
plied to agreements of this type. See Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317
U.S. 476, 479 (1943); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S.
534, 542 (1940) ; White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938).
19621
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must either (1) expressly state a sum certain or (2) give a percent-
age of the payment which is payable for child support. The deter-
mination of the sum allocated for this purpose cannot be left to infer-
ence or conjecture."0
The decision will probably result in a reduction in the quantity
of tax litigation in the alimony-support area since it is now clear to
the draftsman how agreements must be drawn to include periodic
alimony payments in a wife's gross income, or to exclude a portion
from her gross income if that is desirable.3 ' The decision is also a
guide for construction of agreements drawn in the past, since it is
clear that contingent provisions in property settlement agreements are
no longer subject to the "reasonable indication" approach of the
Commissioner. 2 Hardships will be created since Lester does apply
to agreements drawn when there was confusion as to the correct
manner of placing the tax burden on the intended party. The tax
burden has undoubtedly shifted in many instances, entitling the hus-
band to a refund, while creating a tax deficiency for the wife. This
deficiency will be limited to. the period open under the statute of
limitations, usually three years. 3 The husband may file a refund
claim for the period open under the statute as applicable to him.84
" "It is not enough to say that the sum can be computed." Commis-
sioner v. Lester, supra note 29, at 307 (concurring opinion).
" If none of the payment to the wife is fixed as child support, none of
it can'be applied to determine if the husband is entitled to a dependency ex-
emption deduction. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 152(b) (4).8 2 Lester has been followed by the Tax Court in Lindley S. Bettison, 30
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 946 (1961'); Robert E. Dolan, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 898
(1961); Estelle D. Deininger, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1153 (1961). In
Bettison the payments were reduced upon the wife's remarriage. The Tax
Court held that the agreement did not "fix" the amount remaining after
reduction as payable for child support. Even though the inference was
present that the husband was paying the money to support minor children,
the agreement did not expressly state a sum certain or percentage which was
payable for child support. In Bettison the reduced payments were made
under the same provision as the full payment. Quaere, if the agreement
provided, as in Eisinger, that all payments of alimony to the wife were to
cease, and in lieu thereof, a stipulated smaller sum to be paid for the support,
maintenance, and education of minor children? A more equitable solution
might be to include the full payment in the wife's gross income until the
contingent reduction provisions mature. At this time if the reduced payment
is more clearly identified as payable for the support of minor children, it
should not be deductible by the husband.
'* INT. Rv. -CODE OF 1954, § 6501(a). However, if the taxpayer has
omitted from gross income an amount in excess of 25% of the amount stated
in the return, the government's allowable period for assessment is extended
to six years. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 6501 (e) (1) (A). The period may
be extended by agreement of the parties before expiration of the statutory
period. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(c) (4).
", INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 6511(a).
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For closed years, if any are involved, it would seem that the hus-
band's possibility of redress is only that available through mitigation
of the statute of limitations.35
While Lester creates some problems of hardship, the benefits of
simplicity of interpretation and certainty of tax consequences are
much to be desired in applying the federal revenue laws. The de-
cision has also settled a confusing conflict of circuit court authority
in construing property settlement agreements containing contingent
reduction provisions in the event of death or remarriage of the wife,
death of the husband, or because minor.children become of age, die,
or marry. These factors may justify the triumph of form over sub-
stance in this instance, but no extension of that approach is advocated,
either in the federal tax field or other branches of the law.86
MARION A. COWELL, JR.
Federal Income Taxation-Leases-Amortization of Ground Rents
Not infrequently a taxpayer will purchase real property subject to
an outstanding lease. In many instances the lessee will have erected
improvements on the leased land. By virtue of having made a capital
investment in those improvements and avowedly retaining owner-
ship of them until the termination of the lease, the lessee is entitled
to an annual depreciation deduction.' In cases where both these fac-
"' In cases where the parties are "related taxpayers" under the statute, for
instance when the wife is beneficiary under an alimony trust, there appear to
be possibilities of mitigation. Eleanor B. Burton, 1 T.C. 1198 (1943);
Katharine C. Ketcham, 2 T.C. 159 (1943), aff'd, 142 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.
1944); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1311-1314. See generally 2 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INCoME TAXATION ch. 14 (rev. 1961) ; Scheifly, The Operation of
Sections 1311-1314, 13 U. So. CAL.. 1961 TAX INST. 509; Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d
538 (1957).
The doctrine of res judicata applies to tax litigation when the case con-
cerns the same issue for the same tax year, while for subsequent years the
doctrine of collateral estoppel applies. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591 (1948); Tait v.' Western Md. Ry., 289 U.S. 620 (1933). See generally
10 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOMmE' TAXATION ch. 60 (rev. 1958); Griswold,
Res .udicata in Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 1320 (1936-37); Arinot.,
92 L.ED. 913 (1948).
" No cases have been found construing the applicable North Carolina
statutes. However, since the laws are extremely similar, especially in the
provisions relating to deduetibility of child support payments, the need for
clarity, certainty, and conformity in the construction and application of
revenue laws, both state a d federal; should lead the courts of North Caro-
lina to adopt the rule in Lester. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-141 (a), -141.2,
-147(21) (1958).
'Duffy v. Central R.R. of N.J., 268 U.S. 55 (1925); Hotel Kingkade v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1950).
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